'A revolution is impossible in Belarus'

Analysis: A stymied opposition, turmoil in Ukraine and a lack of interest from the west have effectively ruled out prospects of an uprising, writes Siarhei Bohdan.
The political year for the Belarusian opposition begins today, on Freedom Day, with a state-sanctioned rally.

The day, which marks the foundation of the Belarusian People’s Republic in 1918, used to bring thousands to the streets of Minsk to oppose the government ofAlexander Lukashenko – who has been in power since 1994.

Not anymore. The political opposition is suffering from years of exclusion from public sphere; they have not held a seat in parliament since 1996, they are virtually ignored by state-affiliated media and the government have restricted their right to protest.

 The appetite for a revolution has also been quelled by events in neighbouring Ukraine. Belarusians are cautious. The risk of the state collapse, civil strife and Russian interference seems too high. The west, particularly the US, take the same line. Preserving Belarusian independence, not democratisation, has become the highest priority.

‘No conditions for a revolution’

Earlier this month Lukashenko told police there would be no “maidan” style protests in Belarus, referring to the protests in Ukraine that unseated a government. Two days later, the opposition Belarusian People’s Front Party proposed abandoning plans for street protests after the presidential election in November.

Alyaksei Yanukevich, the chairman of the party, argued that few Belarusians would participate.

Indeed, even before the conflict broke out in eastern Ukraine, 78% of respondents told the Independent Institute for Socio-Economic and Political Research that a better future was “not worth people’s blood”. Seventy percent said they did not want a Ukrainian-style revolution.

The lack of a revolutionary appetite is not just about Ukraine. Belarusian circumstances were, and are, very different to those countries where the so-called colour revolutions have taken hold.

Lincoln Mitchell, who previously worked with the National Democratic Institute in a number of post-Soviet nations, has recently published a critical analysis of the so-called colour revolutions in countries such as Ukraine, Georgia and Serbia.

He lists four main premises that lead to their success. First, people should have opportunity to effectively participate in an election and be able to challenge the result.

Second, the media should be able to anticipate election fraud, be able to inform people about fraud, and cover the ensuing protests. Third, the population should not be intimidated by the state. Fourth, in cases where colour revolutions were successful, foreign and international donors and democratisation-oriented NGOs have “a degree of political access and involvement”.

None of these conditions apply in Belarus.

‘Europe’s last dictatorship’

The external environment has also changed. According to Mitchell, by the spring of 2006 Belarus was one of the few countries in the world, and the only one in the former Soviet Union, where the US administration was looking for regime change.

Belarus once was branded Europe’s “last dictatorship” by US secretary of state Condoleezza Rice, despite post-Soviet regimes such as Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan raising much greater concerns about human rights and democracy.

There were geopolitics at play. As US interests focused on the Middle East, Minsk aroused suspicion over its active engagement with radical governments, including its cooperation with Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq. In 2002 Washington organised a conference on Belarus as a “missing link in the axis of evil”, which was attended by such political heavyweights including US senator John McCain and Polish politician Radek Sikorski.

Belarus possessed little strategic value to the US – it was often dismissed as a murky eastern European state under Russian control – but the country was thought of as the place to showcase western commitment to human rights, democratic freedoms, and nuclear non-proliferation.

The west’s change of heart

As of 2015, the geopolitical situation has changed and, as Lukashenko is happy to boast, the west has started to view Belarus in a different light.

Lukashenko recently played peacemaker by hosting Ukraine ceasefire talks and, according to Yanukevich of the BNF party, western governments are now telling Belarus that independence should come before democracy. Their new priority is to avoid a Russian takeover.

Another important detail: Belarus relation to the Middle East have become less of a problem. The country is pursuing a more cautious foreign policy, for example in the early 2010s Minsk minimised its contact with Iran and Syria as they faced increased international isolation.

The west is no longer interested in a Belarusian revolution.

The rise of radical activism

Whilst a colour revolution is impossible in Belarus, there is some probability of clashes with radical clashes around November’s elections.

The Belarusian left-wing website Prasvet recently said that election fraud has led the opposition to lose interest in campaigning with the public. Their logic is clear: if votes aren’t counted there is no point in campaigning, it’s better find groups prepared to come to the square and confront the police.

The appearance of radical nationalist initiatives such as 1863x.com suggests that such a scenario may not be so far-fetched. Belarusian opposition insiders told the Belarus Digest that whilst they had received no foreign money to mount a presidential campaign, extreme radical groups do have sources of funding. 

Simultaneously, the Belarusian law enforcement bodies and security services are monitoring events in Ukraine, meaning they may now be more willing than ever before to resort to extreme measures to defend the government.

Were the radical groups to clash with the government, ordinary Belarusians are likely to lose out. The political regime would become more brutal, its politics more radical, and Belarus’ relations with the west could deteriorate again.

Siarhei Bohdan is a senior analyst at the Ostrogorski Centre and a PhD candidate at Freie Universität Berlin. He is an alumnus of the Belarus State University and European Humanities University in Lithuania.